# EIP-1559 and RSK

**URL:** <https://research.rsk.dev/t/eip-1559-and-rsk/120>\
**Category:** EVM improvements\
**Created:** [February 26, 2021, 9:16pm UTC](https://research.rsk.dev/t/eip-1559-and-rsk/120 "2021-02-26T21:16:01Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![light](https://yyz2.discourse-cdn.com/flex036/user_avatar/research.rsk.dev/light/32/59_2.png) [@light](https://research.rsk.dev/u/light)\
**Post date:** [February 26, 2021, 9:16pm UTC](https://research.rsk.dev/t/eip-1559-and-rsk/120/1 "2021-02-26T21:16:01Z")

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How does the RSK community feel about [EIP-1559](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1559.md)? It seems to be widely supported in the Ethereum community. I was initially tentatively supportive and after reading the [FAQ](https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/BkSQmQTS8) and [Roughgarden report](https://twitter.com/algo_class/status/1333828688916439041) I have been solidly persuaded that it’s an idea worth implementing. (Though for RSK I would support lowering some of the parameters such as average target block gas limit and hard per-block cap to as low as half the parameters specified for Ethereum.)

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**Author:** ![gino.osahon](https://yyz2.discourse-cdn.com/flex036/user_avatar/research.rsk.dev/gino.osahon/32/139_2.png) [@gino.osahon](https://research.rsk.dev/u/gino.osahon)\
**Post date:** [March 2, 2022, 6:57am UTC](https://research.rsk.dev/t/eip-1559-and-rsk/120/2 "2022-03-02T06:57:41Z")

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Here is Sergio’s view on EIP-1559.

> **[Flaws in Ethereum’s EIP-1559](https://medium.com/iovlabs-innovation-stories/flaws-in-ethereums-eip-1559-c0f91838ce23)**
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> EIP-1559 added a mechanism for the Ethereum network to establish a base transaction gas price that dynamically changes depending on the…

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**Author:** ![SergioDemianLerner](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/779978/32.png) [@SergioDemianLerner](https://research.rsk.dev/u/SergioDemianLerner)\
**Post date:** [March 16, 2022, 1:08pm UTC](https://research.rsk.dev/t/eip-1559-and-rsk/120/3 "2022-03-16T13:08:25Z")

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Thanks Gino for posting my article here.

I think that dynamic adjustment of block space is a good idea. The incentive problem is burning the fees. Therefore it’s possible to adopt a variant of EIP-1559 that, instead of burning the base fee, distributes the base fee to the REMASC contract, which will redistribute to future miners with our current 10% smoothing function.

In fact, this is very easy to code because we already have our minimum gas price.  
The main reason why I don’t think this is a good moment to implement this variant is because RSK blocks are not full, and therefore the base fee will go down to zero, effectively removing any spam prevention mechanism.

So the short answer is, we could do it, but doing it now will degrade RSK instead of improve it.